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Abstract
This paper investigates whether earnings management incentives are associated with gains/losses
recognized when firms repurchase bonds. The research question is motivated by the inclusion of
these gains/losses in firms' income, which creates the potential to use them to manage earnings.
Using a sample of 778 bond repurchases from 1994 to 2011, I find that firms record larger
extinguishment gains when earnings are (i) short of analysts' forecasts, or (ii) low relative to the
prior year's earnings. Furthermore, the effect is more pronounced after the introduction of SFAS
145 which moved gains/losses from the extinguishment of debt from extraordinary items to
operating income. In addition, the result is weaker after SFAS 159 which allowed firms to report
liabilities at fair value, thus causing smaller gains to be recorded upon repurchase of debt. This
study contributes to the literature on earnings management by providing evidence of real
earnings management through bond repurchases and to the literature on bond buybacks by
identifying accounting incentives as a determinant of the size of extinguishment gains.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, I examine earnings management incentives in firms that repurchase debt.
Corporations frequently repurchase public debt and stock, and record these transactions in their
financial statements. While there is a well-developed literature on managerial incentives
associated with equity repurchases (Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong 2003; Vafeas, Vlittis,
Katranis and Ockree 2003; Hribar, Jenkins and Johnson 2006), relatively few studies focus on
debt repurchases.' Public debt repurchases, however, have become prevalent in the last few
years. For instance in 2009, the face value of US public corporate debt was 7.0 trillion dollars.2
During this period, more than 200 firms repurchased approximately 3% of total outstanding
corporate debt for a total of approximately $215 billion.3'4 My study contributes to this literature
by investigating whether and to what extent gains/losses recorded upon debt extinguishment
incentives are sensitive to earnings management incentives.5
My research question is motivated by several accounting and economic features of debt
repurchases that provide an interesting context to study earnings management. First, a
corporation can record extinguishment gains or losses on the repurchase of debt. Stock
repurchases, in contrast do not involve accounting gains and losses as they are transactions
between a company and its owners.6 Second, following the introduction of SFAS 145 in 2002,
extinguishment gains are included in income from continuing operations, whereas before they
were classified as extraordinary items. The shift of the item into income from continued
One exception is a study by Levy and Shalev (2011) which finds that macro-economic conditions may affect a
manager's repurchase decision. I discuss their paper in greater detail below.
2 http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (Last accessed 05/12/2013).
3 By contrast, companies announced plans for $133 billion in share repurchases during 2009.
4 This data is from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) and represents open market and tender
repurchases only.
5 Throughout the paper, I use the terms "repurchase" and "extinguishment" interchangeably to refer to the early
retirement of debt via buybacks.
6 The repurchase of shares is recorded as a debit (credit) to treasury stock (cash).
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operations likely heightened incentives to manage earnings using extinguishment gains. Thus,
while previous studies on earnings per share management have focused on equity repurchases
(e.g., Bens et al., 2003; Hribar et al., 2006), the characteristics of bond repurchases outlined here
distinguish the debt market from the equity market, and make bond repurchases an interesting
empirical setting to investigate opportunistic behavior by managers.
An anecdotal example of the possibility to manage earnings using extinguishment gains
is provided in a recent ProSales Magazine article which describes how the repurchase of debt
enabled Ply Gem Holdings Inc. to avoid a loss in the first quarter of 2010: "A $98.2 million gain
from the extinguishment of debt powered Ply Gem Holdings Inc. to swing to a $54.1 million net
profit in the first quarter ended April 3 from a net loss of $55.5 million in the year-earlier period,
the company announced today." 7 In my empirical analyses I examine whether there is systematic
evidence of earnings management using extinguishment gains/losses.
I use a sample of 778 firms that repurchased debt from 1994 to 2011 to examine the
significance of earnings management incentives once the decision to repurchase debt has been
made. I examine the sensitivity of recorded extinguishment gains to earnings management
incentives, specifically when the firm risks missing earnings targets. My tests are based in part
on empirical evidence that managers rely on accounting actions and real transactions to
manipulate earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Roychowdhury 2006; Dechow, Myers and
Shakespeare 2010). I use two measures of earnings targets in my empirical analyses. First, I use
the last consensus analyst forecast prior to the debt repurchase. Studies such as Degeorge, Patel
and Zeckhauser (1999) and Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) find that the analyst consensus
estimate is one of the firm's most important benchmarks.
'http://www.prosalesmagazine.com/net-profit/debt-restructuring-enables-ply-gem-to-swing-to-1 g-net-profit.aspx
(Last accessed 03/20/2013).
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I also use the prior year's earnings as a target, because prior literature finds that firms are
rewarded for reporting positive earnings changes (Barth et al. 1999; Schrand and Walther 2000).
Importantly, these proxies identify firms that are just short of earnings targets, as presumably
they are most likely to engage in upward earnings management in order to meet these objectives.
I compute earnings absent manipulation as the earnings that the firm would have reported if the
repurchase of debt and subsequent inclusion of extinguishment gains/losses did not occur. In
addition, I control for other factors that could explain extinguishment gains such as leverage,
size, credit risk, firm performance prior to repurchase, and macro-level changes in the debt
market.
Consistent with my prediction, recorded extinguishment gains are sensitive to earnings
management incentives. Specifically, higher extinguishment gains are recorded when a firm: (i)
is at risk of not meeting or beating analysts' forecasts, or (ii) has low earnings in the current
period relative to the prior year. In terms economic significance, I find that the inclusion of
extinguishment gains, whose average is 2.3% of net income, results in ~60% of the observations
in my sample meeting/beating these earnings benchmarks, suggesting that extinguishment gains
affect reported earnings. Majority of these observations are clustered in the interval to the
immediate right of the benchmarks, suggesting that the extinguishment gains helped these
managers barely meet/beat their targets. Thus, the results suggest that managers are more likely
to repurchase debt at a discount and record income-increasing extinguishment gains when they
are short of earnings benchmarks.
One concern with bond repurchases is that it is inherently difficult to identify whether the
magnitude of recorded extinguishment gains is driven by earnings management concerns or
economic fundamentals. Specifically, when a firm's performance declines, debt becomes
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cheaper to repurchase and extinguishment gains are larger. Consequently, managers may be
'buying low' rather than managing earnings. In addition, managers may possess information to
suggest that their bonds are undervalued, making repurchase optimal. I attempt to mitigate this
concern by examining the impact of SFAS 145 and SFAS 159, two recent regulatory changes
that affect accounting for debt repurchases. If economic fundamentals drive the decision to
repurchase bonds and record extinguishment gains, changes in accounting standards should not
affect the observed association.
Specifically, SFAS 145 (ASC Topic 470), results in a shift of the location of gains/losses
on the income statement from extraordinary items to an "above-the-line" item. To the extent that
firms care about higher "above-the-line" income (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Beatty and Weber
2006; McVay 2006), post-SFAS 145 I predict and find a more pronounced effect of earnings
management incentives on extinguishment gains. The second accounting change I examine,
SFAS 159 (ASC Topic 825), provides firms with the option to record liabilities at fair value,
leading to a shift in the timing of the recognition of gains/losses. As a result, firms that elect to
record debt at fair value lose discretion in the choice of period to record extinguishment gains as
they are required to recognize gains/losses through fair-value adjustments regardless of whether
a repurchase happens on not. Thus, post-SFAS 159, I predict and find that earnings management
incentives have a weaker effect on recorded extinguishment gains. The results of these tests are
consistent with an earnings management explanations rather than economic fundamentals
("buying low") driving the results.
Finally, I also investigate cross-sectional (as opposed to the two time-series tests above)
variation in the effect of earnings management incentives on the magnitude of extinguishment
gains. This analysis is motivated by the fact that managers are more inclined to engage in
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manipulation when the perceived costs are lower. I focus on a firm's tax attributes because the
extinguishment of debt has tax implications for firms since a repurchase can generate taxable
cancellation of debt (COD) income. To the extent that a firm has net operating losses (NOLs),
these losses may be used to offset COD income and reduce taxes due. I find that earnings
management incentives have a stronger effect on the decision to repurchase for firms with NOLs.
This analysis sheds light on the extent to which offsetting costs can dampen earnings
management incentives.
My study contributes to two main strands of literature. First, I contribute to recent
literature on debt repurchases, which has examined factors that influence the repurchase decision
and investors' reaction to news about repurchases. My study is the first to directly examine
whether earnings management incentives influence extinguishment gains/losses from debt
repurchases. A recent paper by Levy and Shalev (2011) examines whether the method of
repurchase affects the magnitude of extinguishment gains. Other prior studies examined
determinants of bond repurchases such as: debt overhang and the reduction of leverage and
interest expense (Julio 2007; Kruse, Nohel and Todd 2009; Levy and Shalev 2011). My study
shows that earnings management incentives affect the magnitude of recorded extinguishment
gains when a firm repurchases debt. In doing so, I shed light on managers' use of the flexibility
in accounting for debt repurchases to manage earnings. I also examine the role of accounting
standards in strengthening and/or weakening earnings management incentives. To my
knowledge, none of the debt repurchase studies have investigated these questions.
Second, this paper builds on prior studies on real earnings management (Roychowdhury
2006; Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare 2010). I contribute to this body of work by examining
bond repurchases which are significant but have received very little attention to date. I present
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evidence that gains from the repurchase of debt are sensitive to earnings management incentives.
A related study by Hand, Hughes and Sefcik (1990) also finds that firms undertake real
transactions, at least in part for accounting benefits. However, the unique contribution of my
paper is the direct examination of earnings management incentives in the market for bond
repurchases and the investigation of time-series and cross-sectional factors that influence the use
of extinguishment gains to manage earnings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I provide
institutional details and a summary of prior literature. Section 3 develops my hypotheses on the
incentives to engage in earnings management. In Section 4 I describe my sample selection
procedures and discuss the research design. I present the main results, robustness checks, and
supplementary analyses in Section 5. Finally in Section 6, I conclude and provide suggestions for
future bond repurchase research.
2. Background and Prior Research
2.1 Institutional Details on Bond Repurchases and Relevant Accounting Rules
In this section, I provide some background and institutional details on bond repurchases.
A bond buyback is the repurchase by a debtor of its own publicly traded debt. In a sample of
bond repurchases conducted from 1989 to 1996, Kruse, Nohel and Todd (2009) document that
firms commonly identify reduction of debt overhang, financial flexibility, debt restructuring,
merger-related reasons, and interest expense reduction as reasons to repurchase debt. Bond
repurchase transactions are carried out in the secondary bond market, which is highly
fragmented, illiquid and hosts fewer and much more sophisticated participants in comparison to
the stock market (Levy and Shalev 2011).
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The accounting for debt repurchases is important for my study because I examine the
possibility that extinguishment gains/losses from the repurchase of debt are influenced by
earnings management incentives. Under U.S Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP), the historical-cost principle requires bonds to be carried on issuers' books at amortized
historical cost using the effective yield method. If debt is not retired before maturity, the market
value is equal to the book value at maturity date because the principal is due at maturity and is
not discounted for time or risk. However, if a firm retires its debt before maturity, book value
and market value are typically not the same. This leads to the generation of an accounting
gain/loss upon extinguishment. A detailed example demonstrating how extinguishment of debt
can lead to a gain is included in Appendix A.
Current accounting rules governing gains/losses recorded on the extinguishment of debt
are promulgated in SFAS 145 (ASC Topic 470). Previously, under SFAS 4, extinguishment
gains and losses were reported as extraordinary items on the income statement. However, the
introduction of SFAS 145 in 2002 requires the classification of these gains as other income,
which is an "above-the-line" item. This item is not included in operating income but counts
towards income from continuing operations. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
made this change because in order to be categorized as an extraordinary item, the event has to be
both infrequent and unusual; however, as mentioned earlier, debt repurchases have increased in
frequency and are no longer an unusual component of a firm's operations.8 In summary, this new
rule results in a shift of the location of gains/losses on the income statement, but does not affect
cash flows.
Another accounting change that is relevant to my study is SFAS 159 (ASC Topic 825),
which became effective after 2007. This new rule expanded the option to fair-value for financial
8 http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl45.pdf (Last accessed 03/20/2013).
15
instruments beyond derivative liabilities. Resulting gains/losses from changes in fair value are
recognized in income as they occur. In effect, this regulatory change causes a shift in the timing
of the recognition of gains/losses, but the stream of cash flows associated with the debt remains
the same. Therefore, after the introduction of SFAS 159, firms that elect to record debt at fair-
value record a smaller magnitude of gains/losses on the income statement at the time of
extinguishment as some of these gains/losses have already been recognized in prior periods.
Finally, the extinguishment of debt also has tax implications for firms that choose to
engage in bond buybacks. Gains on extinguishment of debt only occur when the debt is
repurchased at a discount. Under Section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), a debtor is
required to recognize cancellation of debt (COD) income when the issuer or related party
purchases the debt at a discount. Unless an exception applies, this income must be recognized at
the time of the repurchase. COD income is typically included in taxable income unless the debt
repurchase occurs pursuant to a bankruptcy plan of reorganization (Section 108). Thus, to the
extent a firm has net operating losses (NOLs), these tax transactions may be used to offset COD
income and reduce or completely eliminate taxes due on the repurchase transaction.9
2.2 Existing Literature on Bond Repurchases
Prior research has examined several aspects of bond repurchase transactions such as: the
determinants of repurchases, market reaction to repurchase announcements, and the derivation of
the repurchase price. Julio (2007) finds an increase in investment levels and firm efficiency for
repurchasing firms relative to a control sample. He interprets this as evidence that a debt
repurchase is consistent with the intention of reducing debt overhang. Levy and Shalev (2011)
9 During the 2008 financial crisis an exception was made pertaining to the recognition of COD income as taxable
income. Specifically, following the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, a firm can elect to defer
taxes on COD income over a five-year period for repurchases occurring after December 31, 2008 and before January
1,2011.
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suggest that macro-economic conditions may affect the decision to conduct a buyback. They
analyze the firm's choice of repurchase method and find that during turbulent periods in the
capital markets, firms engage in increased insider stock trading and they are more likely to buy
back debt in the open market. They also test whether the choice of repurchase method affects the
amount of recorded extinguishment gains. Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramirez (1995) and Kruse,
Nohel and Todd (2009) find mixed results for market reactions to debt repurchase
announcements, while Mao and Tserlukevich (2012) formally develop a framework that
generates direct testable implications on bond repurchase prices. I extend this literature by
broadening our understanding of the factors that affect gains/losses recorded when firms
repurchase debt.
Finally, a study by Hand, Hughes and Sefcik (1990) examines market reaction to the
announcement of in-substance defeasances, which are transactions where the firm sets aside
assets to cover debt repayment. They also find that these firms display smoother earnings,
suggesting that firms engage in these transactions, in part for accounting benefits. However, the
unique contribution of my paper is the direct examination of earnings management incentives in
the market for bond repurchases and the investigation of time-series and cross-sectional factors
that influence the use of extinguishment gains to manage earnings. In sum, earlier literature on
bond repurchases has generally focused on the economic incentives to engage in these
transactions, whereas the innovation in my study is that it focuses on accounting incentives.
3. Hypotheses Development
3.1 Earnings Manipulation through Extinguishment Gains from Debt Repurchases
Prior literature documents that managers manipulate earnings through a combination of
accounting actions and real activities. For example, a survey by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal
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(2005) reports that financial executives acknowledge they would be willing to take actions such
as postponing taking an accounting charge so as to meet earnings benchmarks. Dechow and
Shakespeare (2009) find that managers time the reporting of securitization gains to maximize
financial statement window-dressing. Finally, Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2010)
investigate whether securitization gains are used to manage earnings and find evidence consistent
with managers reporting larger securitization gains when pre-securitization are low and below
the prior year's level. Taken together, the results from these studies lend support to the
prevalence of earnings management via accounting actions from real activities. By focusing on
debt extinguishment gains, my study provides a new, natural setting in which to corroborate and
extend prior evidence.
The accounting and economic features of bond repurchases described above make the use
of extinguishment gains as an earnings management tool likely. Specifically, early
extinguishment of debt results in an accounting gain or loss which is recorded in a firm's income
statement- providing a mechanism by which a firm can report income-increasing gains when the
firm risks missing earnings benchmarks. Therefore, I predict that firms report larger
extinguishment gains when pre-repurchase earnings fall short of earnings benchmarks. My first
hypothesis, stated in alternative form is:
H]. Extinguishment gains are higher when there is a risk of missing an earnings
benchmark.
3.2 Time-series Variation in Extinguishment Gains Due to Changes in Accounting Treatment
One concern with the debt repurchase setting used in this study is that it is inherently
difficult to identify whether the size of recorded extinguishment is influenced by earnings
management incentives or economic fundamentals. To mitigate concerns that economic
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fundamentals and not earnings management are behind my results, I conduct interrupted time-
series tests around changes in accounting standards. The idea is that if economic fundamentals
are behind the decision to record higher extinguishment gains, there should be no change in the
association between earnings manipulation incentives and the gains/losses recorded upon
extinguishment when the new rules are introduced, as these rules only affect the accounting for
gains from debt repurchases and not the firm fundamentals. Conversely, if earnings management
concerns dominate, one would expect to observe a stronger association between earnings
manipulation incentives and recorded gains/losses following the introduction of the new
regulations because earnings management goals are more (less) easily achieved using
extinguishment gains from debt repurchases after SFAS 145 (SFAS 159).
The first accounting rule, SFAS 145, results in a shift of the location of gains on the
income statement from extraordinary items to an "above-the-line" item. There is evidence that
the location of an item on financial statements is economically important. For example, Beatty
and Weber (2006) find that the decision to record goodwill impairments above-the-line versus
below-the-line is affected by factors such as debt contracting, equity market and compensation
incentives. In addition, some studies find that the location of a line item on financial statements
affects valuation, and managers opportunistically shift items on the income statement to manage
earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; McVay 2006). Thus, following the passage of SFAS 145,
gains from debt repurchases become a more favorable earnings management tool. Consequently,
if extinguishment gains are used to meet earnings benchmarks, I expect a stronger association
between extinguishment gains and the risk of missing an earnings benchmark after the
introduction of SFAS 145. My second hypothesis, stated in alternate form is:
H2. The positive association between extinguishment gains and the risk of missing an
earnings benchmark is stronger after the introduction of SFAS 145.
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Evidence consistent with H2 lends credence to the notion that earnings management incentives
influence the decision to record income-increasing gains after a debt repurchase.
I also investigate the impact of SFAS 159 (ASC Topic 825), which affects the timing of
the recognition of gains/losses. Following the introduction of this new rule, firms are required to
report unrealized gains/losses on items for which the fair value option has been elected in
earnings on specified reporting dates. Thus, the partial recognition of some unrealized
gains/losses in prior periods makes it more difficult for firms which elect to record bonds at fair
value to meet earnings benchmarks using extinguishment gains from a debt repurchase.
Therefore, after the introduction of SFAS 159, one would expect a weaker association between
extinguishment gains and the risk of missing an earnings benchmark. My third hypothesis is:
H3. The positive association between extinguishment gains and the risk of missing an
earnings benchmark is weaker after the introduction of SFAS 159.
A primary challenge with this analysis is that under SFAS 159, firms opt in to fair-value by
security and not by firm. Consequently, in my empirical tests I am unable to determine which
bond issues are recorded debt at fair value. I discuss the consequences of this limitation in the
research design section.
3.3 Cross-sectional Variation in Extinguishment Gains - Tax Losses
Next, I examine cross-sectional variation in the use of extinguishment gains to manage
earnings. This analysis is motivated by the fact that the extent of earnings manipulation and the
resulting gains/losses recorded on firms' financial statements vary with any constraints managers
have to undertake such activities. The benefits of meeting an earnings benchmark via
extinguishment gains may be partially offset by any costs the manager has to incur from
choosing to employ this earnings manipulation mechanism. For example, sacrificing a firm's
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much needed cash to repurchase debt at a discount so as to record income-increasing
extinguishment gains could result in future long-term costs if the firm is unable meet its'
operating, investment and/or financing obligations. Such tradeoffs suggest that the presence of
offsetting costs may discourage managers from using extinguishment gains to meet earnings
benchmarks.
My cross-sectional test, which employs a firm's tax attributes (NOLs) as a measure of
costs that may offset the benefits of earnings management, sheds insights on some characteristics
of firms that are likely to manipulate earnings using extinguishment gains. In addition to income
statement effects, extinguishment of debt also has tax implications for firms that choose to
engage in bond buybacks. Although repurchases conducted at a price below the book value of
debt have the benefit of generating income-increasing extinguishment gains for book purposes,
they generate COD income which is taxable. Therefore, firms with COD income and no NOLs
may find that the benefits of recording extinguishment gains are partially offset by the taxes
imposed on COD income, resulting in reluctance by managers to repurchase debt. However, this
constraint is less likely to be applicable to firms with prior net operating losses (NOLs) as these
losses can be used to offset COD income, resulting in reduced tax payments. Therefore, I predict:
H4. The positive association between extinguishment gains and the risk of missing an
earnings benchmark is stronger for firms with net operating losses (NOLs).
A key caveat is that during the recent financial crisis an exception was made pertaining to the
recognition of COD income as taxable income. Specifically, firms had the option to defer taxes
on COD income. I discuss the implications of this election in the research design section.
21
4. Sample and Variable Construction
4.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
I obtain information on bond repurchases from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities
Database (FISD). Mergent FISD contains details on issuance, changes and the reasons for
changes in series of corporate bonds. The database also includes information on bond
characteristics, changes in traded series of bonds due to maturity, refunding, IPO clawbacks,
exercise of call and put options, debt-equity exchanges and repurchases via tender offers or open
market programs. My sample only includes cash repurchases of publicly traded bonds and
excludes debt retirements by calls, puts, sinking funds, conversions, refunding or refinancing. As
Table 1 Panel A shows, my dataset contains 1,974 observations of bond repurchases from 1994
to 2011. I sum up the dollar amount of repurchases for each firm within each year and end up
with a sample of 1,261 firm-year observations.' 0" 1
I then match the bond repurchase data with the Compustat industrial annual file for
financial statement data, the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database for
analysts' forecasts, and the Federal Reserve of St Louis (FRED) website for credit spreads. This
procedure yields a sample of 668 observations. I then hand collect additional information on
extinguishment gains/losses prior to the introduction of SFAS 145 as pre-SFAS 145 Compustat
lumps these gains/losses together with other extraordinary items. Specifically, I hand-collect data
from 1994-2002. I use the Security Exchange Commission's (SEC) Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) to download 10-Ks and read through the notes to find
10 focus on cash repurchases by eliminating buybacks that are part of a debt exchange or a refunding program. As
per FASB's guidance in Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) 96-19, an exchange of debt instruments can only be
accounted for as a debt extinguishment using the provisions of SFAS 140 if the instruments exchanged have
substantially different terms. However, in my setting I have no way to determine whether the exchanges meet these
criteria hence the decision to exclude such buybacks.
" The total amount of repurchases outlined in the introduction includes transactions that were paid for by the
exchange of another security e.g. stock or debt, and the pledge of unbounded property in addition to cash, which my
analyses focus on.
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information on the extinguishment of debt. I collect data starting in 1994 as this is the first year
the SEC instituted electronic filing and dissemination on form 10-Ks. This effort yields an
additional 110 firm-years for a total of 778 observations.
4.2 Research Design and Variable Construction
4.2.1 Tests of Hi: Extinguishment Gains and Risk of Missing Earnings Benchmarks
My first hypothesis, HI, predicts a positive relation between the size of extinguishment
gains and the risk of missing an earnings benchmark. Following the methodology in prior studies
on earnings management through gains from real activities (Dechow and Shakespeare 2009;
Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare 2010), I construct a proxy to capture earnings manipulation. I
compute Gain, my hypothesized amount of earnings management, as the gains from the
extinguishment of debt scaled by total assets from the prior year.
Next, I construct measures of the incentives to manipulate earnings. I rely on prior
evidence that managers have various incentives to meet/beat earnings benchmarks. Examples of
these targets include: analysts' forecasts, high earnings, and loss avoidance (Hayn 1995;
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999. Earnings management (EM) captures these
two targets: Meet/Beat is computed as the actual pre-extinguishment earnings per share (EPS)
minus the latest analysts' consensus EPS forecast prior to the repurchase scaled by common
stock outstanding and multiplied by -, and A Earnings, is the difference in pre-extinguishment
earnings from the current to the previous year multiplied by -1.
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An important assumption underlying my Meet/Beat earnings target measure is that
analysts consider extinguishment gains as part of earnings.' 2 Yet, it is possible that analysts
exclude extinguishment gains in their determination of whether firms meet or beat their
expectations, especially prior to the promulgation of SFAS 145 in 2002 when extinguishment
gains were part of extraordinary items which are typically left out of analysts' forecasts.
However, there is anecdotal evidence consistent with my assumption. For example, in 2000, the
Wall Street Journal ran an article highlighting a debate that had ensued following Fannie Mae's
inclusion of extinguishment gains in its earnings-per-share (EPS) calculations.13 While the
company noted that they had long included extinguishment gains as part of EPS calculations
since retirement of debt was considered part of continuing operations, there were questions as to
whether the inclusion of this gain fairly represented the quarterly results. When sought for
comment, Charles L. Hill, First Call's director of research noted that the rules are not set in
stone. In fact, the article states: "Unsure of how to record the results, First Call surveyed
analysts; nine believed the results should include the gain from extinguishment, while two did
not, although one of the two changed his mind after talking to Fannie Mae."
To test my first hypothesis, I estimate the following model of the association between
extinguishment gains and earnings management targets:
Gaini,t = a + /1 EMi,t + >Z1 f3 Controls; +t (1)
where
Gain the dollar value of gains from the extinguishment of debt
12 Importantly, analysts' consideration of extinguishment gains as part of earnings does not require them to forecast
the size of gain in their earnings estimates, as they may not be able to predict whether a firm will repurchase debt,
and if so, at what price the transaction will be carried out.
13 Source: "Fannie Mae Posts 15% Earnings Gain for the Quarter --- Solid Results Are Clouded By Questions
Involving Methods of Accounting". The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2000: A.2.
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EM
Meet/Beat
J Earnings
(Compustat 'dtep') scaled by total assets (Compustat 'at').
two measures of earnings management incentives related to
analysts' forecasts and earnings reported by the firm:
Meet/Beat, and z Earnings.
= -1*(actual pre-extinguishment earnings per share (EPS)
minus the latest analysts' consensus EPS forecast prior to the
repurchase. I use the last consensus analysts' forecast prior
to the repurchase and exclude companies that change their
fiscal year end during the year to avoid multiple entries for
analysts' forecasts)/ common shares outstanding (Compustat
'csho').
= -1*(difference in pre-extinguishment earnings from the
current to the previous year, scaled by lagged total assets.
Pre-SFAS 145, pre-extinguishment earnings are measured as
the difference between net income after extraordinary items
(Compustat 'ib' + 'xido') and the gain/loss from
extinguishment (Compustat 'dtep'). Post SFAS-145, pre-
extinguishment earnings are measured as the difference
between net income before extraordinary items (Compustat
'ib') and the gain or loss from extinguishment (Compustat
'dtep')). 14
and where Controls are:
Action size
Spread
Firm size
Leverage
ratio of the repurchase amount to the firm's total assets.
credit spread between BBB corporate rated bonds and the
risk free rate.
log of the market value of equity at the beginning of the
year.
book value of all liabilities scaled by total assets.
income before extraordinary items divided by total assets.ROA
14 While the classification of an item as extraordinary does not change bottom-line numbers, an implicit assumption
in the computation of this target is that extraordinary items, which are by definition "infrequent" and "unusual", are
considered less valuable than income from continuing operations. In support of this conjecture, there is evidence that
that the closer a line item is to sales, the less transitory it tends to be, and that investors appear to recognize this
distinction and weight individual items accordingly (e.g. Lipe 1986; Fairfield et al. 1996; Bradshaw and Sloan
2002).
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BTM = ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of
equity.
Rating = the long-term issuer credit ratings compiled by Standard &
Poor's and reported on Compustat (Compustat 'splticrm').
The ratings range from AAA (highest rating) to D (lowest
rating-debt in payment default). These ratings reflect
S&P's assessment of the creditworthiness of the obligor with
respect to its senior debt obligations. In my analysis, I
collapse the multiple ratings into seven categories (AAA,
AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC to D), with ratings below
BBB being defined as speculative.
I expect /, the coefficient on Meet/Beat and z Earnings, to be positive.1 5 Results
consistent with this conjecture can be interpreted as evidence of managers' use of
extinguishment gains to boost earnings when the firm is at risk of missing earnings targets. In
keeping with prior literature (Levy and Shalev 2011), I control for various factors that can affect
extinguishment gains. Action Size controls for the repurchase amount, Spread controls for the
effect of macro-level fluctuations on the market value of debt, Firm size takes into account that
larger firms tend to have more outstanding debt than smaller ones, making them more likely to
repurchase debt and record gains, Leverage controls for the likelihood that highly levered firms
are likely to repurchase debt and record gains, ROA controls for firm performance prior to
repurchase, and BTM controls for a firm's growth opportunities, which could affect the need to
adjust the existing capital structure through repurchasing debt. I also include a Rating, a control
" As described earlier, the variable Meet/Beat is computed using the I/B/E/S consensus forecast. If analysts exclude
all extraordinary items from their forecasts, then prior to the introduction of SFAS 145, 1 would not expect managers
to attempt to manipulate earnings using extinguishment gains. The discussion in Arbabanell and Lehavy (2007)
mentions that in general, I/B/E/S forecasts are compiled using proprietary procedures which exclude certain special
items from GAAP earnings. However, the authors also note that it is not possible to determine which specific items
are excluded. Further, in conversations with I/B/E/S officials, the authors find that specific items can be dealt with
idiosyncratically in individual cases. Thus, there is the possibility that extinguishment gains could be included in
analysts' forecasts prior to the introduction of SFAS 145.
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for a borrower's creditworthiness. To the extent that credit risk affects the market value of debt,
the magnitude of extinguishment gains increases with the difference between book and market
value of debt. Finally, I also include firm and year fixed effects in the regression to control for
firm and time variation.
4.2.2 Tests of H2 & H3: Effects of Accounting Rule Changes on Earnings Management
Incentives
In order to test my predictions on the impact of accounting changes on the association
between earnings targets and extinguishment gains, I augment Equation 1 to take into account
the effect of regulatory changes that affect extinguishment gains as follows:
Gaini,t = a + #1EMi,t + #2 Post 145 + #3 EM * Post 145 + Ej #1 Controls; + Eit (2)
Gaini,t = a + #1 EMi,t + #32 Post 145 + #3 Post 159 + /4 EM * Post145 + 3l Post145 * Post159 + #36 EM *
Postl59 + #7 EM * Post 145 * Post 159 + Zj #l Controls + Ei,t (3)
Post 145 is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond repurchase was executed after the
passage of SFAS 145 in 2002 and zero otherwise. In Equation 2, the coefficient of interest is /3
on variable EM * Post 145. 1 expect the coefficient on this variable to be positive, suggesting that
the introduction of SFAS 145, which mandates a shift in the classification of extinguishment
gains/losses from extraordinary items to "above-the-line", strengthens the relation between
earnings benchmarks and extinguishment gains.
Post 159 is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond repurchase was executed after the
passage of SFAS 159 in 2007 and 0 otherwise. In Equation 3, the coefficient of interest is p7 on
variable EM * Post 145* Post 159. I expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative,
suggesting that the introduction of SFAS 159, which gives firms the option to record liabilities at
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fair value, mutes the incentives to manage earnings via extinguishment gains. The attenuated
relation between earnings benchmarks and extinguishment gains results from the recognition of
some gains/losses in prior periods via fair-value adjustments, preventing managers from
exercising discretion in determining the magnitude of extinguishment gains when debt is
repurchased. I include both Post 145 and EM * Post 145 to account for the fact that SFAS 145
continues to apply even after the introduction of SFAS 159.16 I also include firm fixed effects in
these regressions.
4.2.3 Tests of H4: Cross-Sectional Variation of Earnings Management Incentives
Ilypothesis 4 predicts cross-sectional variation in the use of extinguishment gains to
manage earnings. To test H4, I augment Equations (1) with a proxy for earnings management
costs, NOLs, and estimate the following regression:
Gaini,t = a + /31 EM, + l2 NOLs + /3s EM * NOLs + Z; /3; Controls + Ei,t (4)
In estimating equation (4), I limit my analyses to the period after the introduction of SFAS 145.
While this additional restriction results in the loss of some observations, the resulting empirical
model is facile and does not have complex, interaction terms which may be difficult to explain.
NOLs is a dichotomous variable coded as one if the unused portion of net loss carry-
forward (Compustat 'tlcf') is positive at the beginning of year t, and zero otherwise. In equation
4, the variable of interest is EM * NOLs. I expect the coefficient on this variable, #3, to be
positive. This estimate suggests greater flexibility in the use of extinguishment gains to meet
16 A primary challenge with this analysis is that under SFAS 159, firms opt in to fair-value by security and not by
firm. Consequently, in my empirical tests I am unable to determine which repurchased bond issues are recorded at
fair value. Importantly, the decision to include firms which do not elect to record debt at fair value leads to a bias
against finding results as earnings management incentives for non-fair value firms should not be dampened
following this regulatory change. I plan to strengthen this part of my analyses by hand-collecting information on the
decision to fair value debt from firms' financial statements.
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earnings benchmarks for firms with NOLs for the following reason: firms with COD income and
no NOLs may find that the benefits of managing earnings via extinguishment gains are partially
offset by the taxes imposed on COD income. However, this constraint is less likely to be
applicable to firms with prior net operating losses (NOLs) as these losses can be used to offset
COD income.
As noted earlier, following the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
firms had the option to defer tax payments on COD income. However, I am unable to determine
which firms elected to defer taxes on their COD income. As a result, in my empirical analyses I
do not control for this regulatory shift. However, the measurement error induced should bias
against significant results because retention of firms that elected to defer taxes on COD income
likely understates the extent to which offsetting costs weaken earnings management incentives; I
classify firms with NOLs as facing lower costs of earnings management while this exception also
provides firms without NOLs the flexibility to manage earnings as tax payments on COD income
can be deferred.
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Summary Statistics
Figure 1 plots the number of repurchases over time. The graph which shows an
increasing trend in debt repurchase activity over the years, from 1 repurchase in 1994 to 210 in
2010, demonstrates that these transactions have become increasingly frequent and their
significance has increased. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for my debt repurchase sample.
Table 1 Panel B reports the distribution of my sample across 1-digit SIC industries. The number
of repurchases ranges from 191 or 24.55% (financial, insurance and real estate firms) to 58 or
7.46% (agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining firms) of my sample. While the financial,
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insurance and real estate firms seem to have the highest debt repurchase activity, overall
repurchases seem to be distributed across a fairly wide range of industries and do not exhibit
clustering. Finally, Table 1 Panel C shows that debt repurchases retire a significant proportion of
the outstanding debt issue, ranging from 55% to 100%.
Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive characteristics on the dependent variable used in the
firm-year analyses. For the mean (median) sample firm, extinguishment gains are 1.2% (0.1%)
of total assets and 4.7% (2.3%) of net income. In my sample, 63% of firm-years report
extinguishment gains, 22% extinguishment losses, and 15% report neither gains nor losses. The
observation that extinguishment gains arc more prevalent than losses is consistent with firms on
average repurchasing debt at a discount relative to book value. On average, pre-repurchase
earnings fall short of analysts' forecasts (-0.003), but are similar to earnings from the prior year
(0.000). 36% of the observations in my sample have net operating losses. The average leverage
ratio of 39.9% implies that firms that repurchase debt are significantly levered. Finally, the
average ROA of -0.015 suggests that firms in my sample experience relatively weak
performance prior to the repurchase. I winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99%. Table 2
Panel B reports characteristics of the repurchased debt. The average (median) amount of debt
that is repurchased is $267 million ($150 million). Repurchases generally retire a significant
proportion of the outstanding bond issue (69%) and reduce the maturity of the outstanding debt
from 14 years to 8 years. The premium over market price offered for repurchases is 0.75%
(5.23%) at the mean (median).
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5.2 Main Results
5.2.1 Results from Tests of Hi: Extinguishment Gains and Risk of Missing Earnings
Benchmarks
Table 3 presents the results of the main tests. In these and all subsequent regressions, I
report t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional and time-series correlation
using a two-way cluster at the firm and year level (Petersen 2009). In column 1, the coefficient
on Meet/Beat is statistically significant as expected (coefficient = 0.32, t = 4.61). These results
suggest that managers may use debt repurchases opportunistically to manipulate earnings so as to
avoid missing analysts' earnings forecasts. Table 3 Column 2 reports the results for the second
measure of earnings manipulation incentives, J Earnings. Consistent with the predictions in HI
and the finding in Column 1, the coefficient is positive and also statistically significant
(coefficient = 0.29 t = 4.61), corroborating results from the first measure that managers rely on
extinguishment gains to boost reported income when there is a risk of missing an earnings
benchmark. Together, these results indicate that the magnitude of extinguishment gains recorded
when a firm repurchases debt is influenced by earnings manipulation incentives.
Consistent with the evidence in prior work such as Levy and Shalev (2011),
extinguishment gains/losses are positively associated with credit spreads, the amount of debt
repurchased, firm size and leverage. These results may be interpreted in the following way:
During periods marked by uncertainty and illiquidity in the debt markets, debt is likely to trade at
a discount resulting in extinguishment gains upon the repurchase of debt. Firms that undertake
larger repurchases are more likely to record larger gains/losses as a result of the magnitude of the
transaction. Bigger firms are also more likely to have more debt to repurchase than smaller firms,
leading to larger extinguishment gains/losses. Highly levered firms are also more likely to
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repurchase debt, leading to larger gains/losses in comparison to less-levered counterparts. In
addition, extinguishment gains/losses are negatively associated with prior performance, firm
credit risk and the book-to-market ratio. These findings indicate that poor performance in the
prior period may motivate the decision to repurchase debt, resulting in larger extinguishment
gains/losses. Finally, data in growth firms (BTM) show that they are less likely to record
gains/losses when debt is repurchased.
The outcome of the inclusion of extinguishment gains and losses in earnings is shown in
Figure 2 and 3. In Figure 2, I find that the distribution of pre-extinguishment earnings is more
dispersed than that of reported earnings which take into account the effect of extinguishment
gains. I also find a discontinuity in the frequency of observations around zero in the reported
earnings distribution, but do not observe it in the pre-extinguishment earnings series, implying
that firms use extinguishment gains to cross the zero threshold.
According to Figure 3, for 7% of the sample, earnings are negative after including the
gain, and for 60% of the sample inclusion of the extinguishment gains results in a switch from
negative to positive earnings, suggesting that inclusion of extinguishment gains affects reported
earnings. Majority of these observations are clustered in the interval to the immediate right of the
benchmarks. For example, 70% of observations where inclusion of extinguishment gains resulted
in a switch from negative to positive earnings (38% of the total sample) are clustered in the bin
where the cumulative effect of including extinguishment gains is between 0 and 5% of net
income, implying that the gains helped these managers barely meet/beat their targets. Thus, the
results suggest that managers are more likely to repurchase debt at a discount and record income-
increasing extinguishment gains when they are short of earnings benchmarks. In summary, the
results in this section suggest that managers are more likely to repurchase debt at a discount and
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record income-increasing extinguishment gains when they are short of earnings benchmarks.
5.2.2 Results from Tests of H2 and H3: Time-series Variation of Extinguishment Gains due to
Changes in Accounting Treatment
In Table 4, I document the results of changes in earnings manipulation incentives
following the introduction of SFAS 145 and SFAS 159. In column 1, the coefficient on the
interaction term Meet/Beat * Post 145 is significant (coefficient = 0.03 t = 4.13), suggesting that
the introduction of SFAS 145, which mandates a shift in the classification of extinguishment
gains/losses from extraordinary items to "above-the-line", intensifies preferences in the use of
extinguishment gains to manage earnings. I report the results for z Earnings * Post 145 in
column 3, and the tenor of the results is the same (coefficient = 0.14 t = 3.41). Thus, the results
across the two specifications are consistent with the explanation that the observed relation
between extinguishment gains and the risk of missing an earnings benchmark is driven by
earnings management incentives rather than economic fundamentals.
In Table 4 columns 2 and 4 I report the results of the tests following the introduction of
SFAS 159. Across the two specifications, I find a weaker association between extinguishment
gains and the risk of missing earnings benchmarks following the introduction of SFAS 159. In
column 2, the coefficient on the SFAS 159 interaction term is significant in both specifications
(Meet/Beat * Post 145 * Post 159 coefficient = -0.02 t = 1.40 and 4 Earnings* Post 145 * Post
159 coefficient = -0.11 t = -1.20). This result suggests that the introduction of SFAS 159, which
gives firms the option to record liabilities at fair value, dampens managers' inclination to manage
earnings through extinguishment gains/losses as some of these gains/losses have already been
recognized in prior periods. While the effects are statistically insignificant, it is reasonable given
my tests are subject to measurement error, because not all firms not all firms elect the fair-value
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option and thus not all are impacted by the changes associated with SFAS 159. In summary, the
results from Table 4 only weakly support the prediction that the documented relationship
between the risk of missing an earnings target and extinguishment gains is driven by accounting
motivations as opposed to economic fundamentals.
5.2.3 Results from Tests of H4: Cross-Sectional Variation of Earnings Management via
Extinguishment Gains
Table 5, presents the results from the tests of H4. Recall that this cross-sectional test
examines the tradeoff managers face in recording an extinguishment gain for accounting
purposes, because this gain is also taxable In both columns, the coefficient on the interaction
term is significant Meet/Beat * NOLs coefficient = 0.02 t = 2.44, and 4 Earnings* NOLs
coefficient = 0.03 t = 3.29). These findings can be interpreted as evidence that firms with tax net
operating losses are more likely to manage earnings using extinguishment gains. Firms with net
operating losses face a lower tax cost upon debt extinguishment and are thus more likely to
extinguish debt to increase earnings. These findings can be interpreted as evidence that firms
with tax net operating losses are more likely to manage earnings using extinguishment gains.
Firms with net operating losses face a lower tax cost upon debt extinguishment and are thus more
likely to extinguish debt to increase earnings.
5.3 Robustness Tests
I conduct an array of robustness tests on my main results. In the first set of tests, I address
the potential concern that in spite of my time-series and cross-sectional tests above my results
could still be capturing extinguishment gain effects unrelated to earnings management
incentives. In particular, my empirical analyses could be suffering from a correlated omitted
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variable bias. For example, it is possible that managers repurchase debt to adjust capital structure
by reducing leverage. Also, managers might strategically opt to repurchase debt when it is
trading relatively cheaply. However, a firm's debt trades cheaply when the firm is performing
poorly, which corresponds to periods when managers have incentives to manipulate earnings. As
a result, the effect on extinguishment gains I observe may be driven by the goal of reducing
leverage and not opportunistic earnings management incentives.
In order to mitigate this concern, I examine whether the effects on the magnitude of
recorded extinguishment gains are driven by firms whose leverage decreases after a debt
repurchase or whether the effect persists across firms regardless of their change in leverage after
the repurchase transaction. I do this by partitioning my sample into two subsamples based on the
difference of the leverage ratio in the year before and after the repurchase. The first group,
IncLev consists of observations where the leverage ratio either remained constant or increased in
the year after the repurchase transaction. The second group, DecLev comprises observations
where leverage decreased after the repurchase transaction. I then re-estimate my regressions in
the IncLev subsample of 337 observations. Using this group greatly reduces the possibility that a
manager's choice to reduce leverage when market prices are optimal could be driving the results
because these firms either maintain or increase the amount of debt after the purchase.
Results of the tests of HI using this alternative specification are shown in Table 6. As
expected, the coefficient on EM is positive across both earnings manipulation incentive proxies:
Meet/Beat coefficient = 0.13, t = 2.01), and J Earnings coefficient = 0.14 t= 2.11). These results
appear weaker when compared to findings from the full sample and could be as a result of small
sample bias, resulting in lower power. Nonetheless, while the results of this test appear
somewhat weaker (smaller coefficients and R2), the risk of missing an earnings benchmark
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appears to influence the magnitude of reported extinguishment gains. In untabulated results, I
continue to find weakly significant results for my tests of the remaining hypotheses on time-
series and cross-sectional variation. Thus, it appears that some repurchases are done for purely
'paper' reasons to manage earnings.
In the second set of robustness tests, I exclude observations from the financial industry.
In addition to financial and tax reporting considerations, firms in the financial industry also face
regulatory capital regulation, which potentially impacts the propensity to manage earnings via
extinguishment gains differently. As financial firms count towards a sizable portion of my
sample (~25%), I exclude them and re-run my analyses (untabulated) and find that my results are
robust to their exclusion.
In the third set of tests, I examine whether the earnings shortfall actually motivates
managers to repurchase debt. My main empirical tests, which are conducted on a sample of firms
that repurchased debt, hold constant the decision to repurchase. Consequently, my results do not
speak as to whether the repurchase is actually driven by "window-dressing" incentives, or other
economic reasons such as debt restructuring and interest expense reduction, and are simply timed
to occur when there are maximum benefits such as periods when the firm risks missing its
earnings targets. In order to shed light on the role earnings management incentives have on the
actual decision to repurchase debt, I employ a 1-to-i matched-sample strategy to create a group
of firms with characteristics similar to those that repurchase debt but choose not to do so. This
essentially creates a control sample, such that conditional on the control variables, the decision to
repurchase debt can be modeled as randomly distributed between the two samples. I then
estimate my regression using the following alternative specifications:
P( Repurchase) = a + f31EM,t + f 2 Post 145 + fl3 EM * Post 145 + >j f;j Controls; + Ei't (5)
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P(Repurchase)i,t = a + f#EM,t + #l2 Post 145 + f3 Post 159 + fl4 EM * Post145 + fs Post145 *
Post159 + #6 EM * Post159 + #37EM * Post 145 * Post 159 + Ej f# Controls + Ei,t (6)
The results of these tests are reported in Table 8 Panels A and B. As expected, the
coefficient on EM * Post 145 is positive, but insignificant (Meet/Beat* Post 145 coefficient =
0.05 t =0.29, and z Earnings coefficient = 0.04 t =0.58) and that on Meet/Beat * Post 145 * Post
159 is negative and insignificant as well (Meet/Beat * Post 145 * Post 159 coefficient = -0.01 t
=-0.54, and J Earnings* Post 145 * Post 159 coefficient -0.05 t =-0.76). While the
insignificance of these results suggests that accounting motivations may not be a first-order
reason to actually repurchase debt, it does not ignore the possibility that managers take into
account the effect extinguishment gains have on reported earnings.
Finally, I also include an alternative measure of the prevailing macro-economic
conditions when debt is repurchased. Following Levy and Shalev (2011), I use the Chicago
Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX) which measures the implied volatility of the
S&P 500 index. This measure is often referred to as the fear index or the fear gauge. VIX is
measured as the average level in the year in which the repurchase occurs. Data on VIX is
obtained from the Yahoo Finance website. 7 Using this alternative specification, earnings
management incentives continue to affect the magnitude of extinguishment gains. Taken
together, the results from these sensitivity tests corroborate my earlier findings that earnings
management incentives influence the decision to repurchase debt.
17 http://finance.yahoo.com/ci?s=^VIX (Last accessed 03/20/2013)
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5.4 Supplemental analyses: Variation in Earnings Management Incentives Partitioned by
Method of Repurchase
My main empirical tests lump two types of repurchases: open market repurchases and
tender offers. However, given the inherent differences between the two types of transactions, ex-
ante it is unclear whether the type of repurchase is a determinant of the size of extinguishment
gain recorded after a debt repurchase. My supplemental tests, in which I conduct my previous
empirical tests on subsamples partitioned by method of repurchase, shed insight on which of the
two methods could be more effective as an earnings management tool.
In an open market offer, the transaction is normally executed by two dealers. The
transaction price is set between the buyer's dealer and the seller's dealer, hence the
counterparty's identity remains unknown. Such transactions are hard to price because of the
market illiquidity and the sparse availability of data on bond transactions. Open market
repurchases are typically not pre-announced; therefore at the time of implementation, they can be
done without other bondholders' knowledge, although they have to be disclosed ex-post. 18,19
With tender offers, the issuing firm typically issues a press release or discloses intent to buy back
bonds in its financial statements and sends an offer letter to all known bondholders inviting them
to sell the bonds back to the firm (Levy and Shalev 2011).20 In summary, on one hand, tender
offers entail substantial costs and are usually offered at a premium over current market prices,
1 TRACE provides information about over the counter corporate bonds transactions since 2002. Since 2002,
reporting on TRACE has gradually been expanded to include more bonds and became complete in February 2005
(Bushman et al. 2010). TRACE provides information about transaction size, price (inclusive of markdowns,
markups and commissions) and date, but does not identify the buyer, the seller or even the dealer that executes the
transaction.
19 Unless an issuer is willing to disclose its repurchase intentions to all investors, it has to be careful not to disclose
his information to any of the bondholders, in order not to violate Regulation FD (Levy and Shalev 2011).
20 See also htp://www.lw.com/Resources.aspx?page=FirmPublicationDetail&attno=06826&publication=2141 (Last
accessed 10/13//2012).
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reducing the gains on extinguishment of debt. On the other hand, tender offers are much larger in
scale, extinguishing a larger portion of debt, presumably resulting in larger extinguishment gains.
Also, tender offers are typically completed within a shorter period than open market offerings,
which could be useful if the manager has a short horizon over which to manage earnings.
Similar to Levy and Shalev (2011), the statistics in Table 2 Panel C suggest that firms
that choose to repurchase debt in the open market and those that do so via tender offer are mostly
similar. The leverage of the average tendering firm is slightly higher than that of the average
open market repurchase firm (0.43 vs. 0.39). Using the log of total assets as a measure of size, I
document that the median size of a tendering firm is bigger than an open market repurchase firms
(8.56 vs. 7.39). There is also evidence that both forms of repurchase are associated with
relatively weak performance prior to the repurchase. A significant difference that I find,
however, is that open market repurchase firms are more likely to record gains upon
extinguishment of debt while tender repurchases record losses.
The results of the multivariate analyses are reported in Table 8. I document stronger
results for the effect of earnings manipulation incentives on extinguishment gains in the open
market repurchases sub-sample (Meet/Beat coefficient = 0.25 t = 4.44 and z Earnings coefficient
= 0.31 t = 3.21) compared to tender offers (Meet/Beat coefficient = 0.25 t = 1.42 and A Earnings
coefficient = 0.28 t = 2.90), suggesting that the lower premiums and relative flexibility in the
timing of open market repurchases compared to tender offers make them a more effective
earnings management mechanism. In untabulated results, the time-series and cross-sectional
predictions are also generally stronger for the open market repurchases, but not significantly
different from the tender offers.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper I investigate whether earnings management incentives influence the
magnitude of recorded extinguishment gains. Using a sample of 778 debt repurchases from
1994-2011, I test whether firms with earnings manipulation incentives - firms that risk reporting
earnings less than the consensus analyst forecast and the previous year's earnings - record higher
extinguishment gains and find evidence consistent with this prediction. Furthermore, I find
evidence that the association is more pronounced after the introduction of SFAS 145, and weaker
post-SFAS 159. I also investigate cross-sectional variation in earnings management incentives
using a firm's tax attributes as a proxy for costs of manipulating earnings and find that such costs
matter.
My analyses shed light on previously unexplored managerial incentives resulting from
the alteration of a firm's capital structure through the extinguishment of debt. I also contribute to
the earnings management body of research. SFAS 145 fundamentally changed the manner in
which accounting for the extinguishment of debt is done. FASB noted that debt extinguishments
are typically normal and recurring business events for business entities, and, as such, the gains
and losses from such extinguishments should not be considered extraordinary unless they meet
the "unusual in nature" and "infrequent in occurrence" criteria. My findings that there is a
possibility that managers may use the gain on extinguishment of debt to improve reported
earnings demonstrate what may be an unintended consequence of this regulatory change. I
caution other mechanisms could be at play in earnings manipulation, but my evidence that firms
with the highest incentive to boost earnings use extinguishment gains to do so, supports my
predictions that firms use this amount to manage earnings.
In this paper, I have only explored two issues related to debt repurchases. Given the
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existing limited research on the topic, there appears to be significant potential to explore other
interesting unresolved questions. For example, is the earnings management incentives relation
stronger in the presence of issue characteristics such as whether the debt is unsecured or
subordinated as such issues are likely to be more sensitive to actions taken to reduce the value of
debt? Do the incentives to manage earnings vary with the presence of performance pricing
agreements, loan contracts or the managerial compensation mix? Income from the
extinguishment of debt counts towards earnings from continuing operations. Since earnings
components under this category are regarded as "frequent" and "usual", do extinguishment
gains/losses display differential persistence in comparison to other components of earnings? Are
extinguishment gains/losses predictive of future asset write-downs? Answers to these questions
could be useful in extending our understanding of debt repurchases.
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Appendix A: Example of a Transaction that Results in an Extinguishment Gain
Assume ABC Co. decides to repurchase debt on January 1st, 2011. The book value of the
repurchased debt on this debt is $100,000. Assume the company repurchases the bond for
$89,454. Ignore any transaction costs.
Extinguishment gain: $10,546 = $100,000 - $89,454.
The corresponding journal entry to record this transaction would be:
Dr. Bonds Payable 100,000
Cr. Cash
Cr. Gain on Early Extinguishment
89,454
10,546
The financial statements at the end of the period would look as follows:
ABC CO.
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS
(in thousands)
Revenues
Operating expenses:
Cost of operations
Selling, general and administration
Depreciation
Operating income
Other expense/(income), net:
Interest expense
->Gain on debt extinguishment
Minority interest
Other expense/(income)
Other expense, net
Income from continuing operations
Fiscal year
2011
611,520
256,488
35,410
50,212
ended December 31,
2010 2009
588,000 560,000
243,664
33,640
47,701
231,480
31,958
45,316
342,110 325,005 308,754
269,410 262,996 251,246
23,458 22,285 21,171
(10,546)
(1,000) (3,540)
4,321 2,564 3,420
26,779
242,631
10,763
252,232
24,591
226,655
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Appendix B: Example of a Debt Tender Offer Repurchase Pre-Announcement
TULSA, Okla., Nov. 7, 2011 /PRNewswire/ -- Williams (NYSE: WMB) today announced
the commencement of cash tender offers for the series of notes and debentures listed below
(the "Notes") for an aggregate purchase price of up to $1 billion (the "Tender Cap"). The
terms and conditions of the tender offers are
7, 2011, and related Letter of Transmittal.
holders from Global Bondholder Services
agent for the tender offers.
described in the Offer to Purchase, dated Nov.
Copies of these documents are available to
Corporation, the depositary and information
Fixed Early
mount cceptance Spread U.S. Treasury Reference Tender
Title of Security CUSIP Outstanding Priority (Basis Security Payment
Level Points) (a)
7.875% Notes due 2021 969457BG4 $571,321,000 1 215 bps 2.125% due Aug. 15, 2021 $30.00
7.50% Debentures due 2031 969457BB5 $526,573,000 1 220 bps 3.750% due Aug. 15, 2041 $30.00
969457BA7
J96906AC3
7.75% Notes due 2031 969457BD1 $369,020,000 1 230 bps 3.750% due Aug. 15, 2041 $30.00
8.75% Notes due 2032 969457BM1 $686,218,000 1 240 bps 3.750% due Aug. 15, 2041 $30.00
8.125% Notes due 2012 969457BK5 $24,313,000 2 37.5 bps 1.375% due March 15, 2012 $30.00
7.625% Notes due 2019 969457AW0 $31,655,000 3 185 bps 2.125% due Aug. 15, 2021 $30.00
8.75% Senior Notes due 2020 969457BS8 $13,565,000 4 200 bps 2.125% due Aug. 15, 2021 $30.00
969457BR0
U96906AF6
7.70% Debentures due 2027(b) 565097AF9 $2,040,000 5 195 bps 3.750% due Aug. 15, 2041 $30.00
(a) Per $1,000 principal amount of Notes tendered by the Early Tender Time and accepted for purchase.
(b) Originally issued by MAPCO Inc., which was acquired by Williams in March 1998.
The tender offer for each series of Notes will expire at 12:00 midnight, New York City time,
on Dec. 6, 2011, (the "Expiration Time"), unless extended.
The applicable total consideration per $1,000 principal amount of each series of Notes
(the "Total Consideration") will be determined as described in the Offer to Purchase
based on the present value of future payments on the applicable series of Notes
discounted to the settlement date at a discount rate equal to the sum of the yield to
maturity for the applicable reference security, calculated by the dealer managers based on
the bid-side price at 2:00 p.m., New York City time, on Nov. 21, 2011, plus the applicable
fixed spread, minus accrued interest up to, but not including, the settlement date.
Holders of Notes that are validly tendered and not validly withdrawn at or prior to 5 p.m.,
New York City time, on Nov. 21, 2011 (the "Early Tender Time"), unless extended, and
accepted for purchase will receive the Total Consideration on the settlement date, which is
expected to be Dec. 7, 2011.
45
Holders of Notes that are validly tendered after the Early Tender Time and at or prior to the
Expiration Time and accepted for purchase will receive the Total Consideration minus an
amount in cash equal to the amounts listed in the table above under the heading "Early
Tender Payment," which will be payable on the settlement date.
In addition, payments for Notes purchased will include accrued interest up to, but not
including, the settlement date.
The amount of each series of Notes that may be accepted for purchase will be determined
in accordance with the Acceptance Priority Levels set forth above and may be prorated as
described in the Offer to Purchase. All Notes validly tendered and not validly withdrawn of
the series with Acceptance Priority Level 1 will be accepted before any Notes of the series
with Acceptance Priority Level 2 and so forth through succeeding levels. If the aggregate
purchase price that would be payable for all Notes validly tendered and not validly
withdrawn of any series or group of series with the same Acceptance Priority Level exceeds
the remaining amount available under the Tender Cap, such Notes will be accepted for
purchase on a pro rata basis. In that event, Notes with an Acceptance Priority Level
following the prorated series or group of series will not be accepted for purchase.
Tenders of Notes may be validly withdrawn at any time up until 5 p.m., New York City time,
on Nov. 21, 2011, unless such date and time are extended (such date and time, as the same
may be extended, the "Withdrawal Deadline"), but after such time may not be validly
withdrawn unless Williams is required by law to permit withdrawal. Tenders of Notes
made after the Withdrawal Deadline may not be validly withdrawn at any time unless
Williams is required by law to permit withdrawal. Williams reserves the right, but is not
obligated, to increase the Tender Cap in its sole discretion without extending the
Withdrawal Deadline or otherwise reinstating withdrawal rights.
The consummation of the tender offers is conditioned upon the satisfaction or waiver of
the conditions set forth in the Offer to Purchase, including the financing condition
described therein.
Williams has retained Barclays Capital and Citigroup as lead dealer managers, and Global
Bondholder Services Corporation as the depositary and information agent for the tender
offers.
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Appendix C: Excerpts From Firm's 10-Ks Showing Effects of the Repurchase on Earnings
Valassis Communications Inc. (VCI) 2010 10-K:
Net Earnings (Loss)
Net earnings were $385.4 million and $66.8 million for the years ended December 31, 2010 and
2009, respectively, and a net loss of $209.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2008.
Diluted earnings per common share were $7.42 and $1.36 for the years ended December 31,
2010 and 2009, respectively, and was a diluted loss per common share of $4.37 for the year
ended December 31, 2008.
Non-GAAP Financial Measures
Net earnings (loss) and earnings (loss) per diluted common share for the years ended December
31, 2010, 2009 and 2008 were impacted by certain items, including an impairment charge, gain
from litigation settlement and extinguishment of debt. Adjusted net earnings, excluding these
items, were $98.7 million, $60.6 million and $13.7 million for the years ended December 31,
2010, 2009 and 2008, respectively, or $1.90, $1.23 and $0.29, respectively, per diluted common
share. These year-over-year increases were due to volume growth and our improved cost
structure as the result of our business optimization and cost containment efforts. The following
table reconciles net earnings (loss) and earnings (loss) per diluted common share for the years
ended December 31, 2010, 2009 and 2008 to adjusted net earnings and adjusted net earnings per
diluted common share, which exclude the items described above:
1w IYew FA"
NDwooober)
Lin~m~am~afdLmPer 13.7 Per Pe2r(.1)
Adpassa.ai...gs $ 98.7$s 1.90$5 60.6$5 1.3$ 13.7$ 0.29
We define adjusted net earnings and adjusted net earnings per diluted common share as net
earnings (loss) excluding the items indicated in the table above. We present adjusted net
earnings and adjusted net earnings per diluted common share because we believe that these
measures are useful to investors as they provide measures of our profitability on a more
comparable basis to historical periods because they exclude items we do not believe are
indicative of our core operating performance. In addition, we exclude these items when we
internally evaluate our company's performance.
Adjusted net earnings and adjusted net earnings per diluted common share are not calculated or
presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP and have limitations as analytical tools and should not
be considered in isolation from, or as alternatives to, operating income, net income, cash flow,
EPS or other income or cash flow data prepared in accordance with GAAP. We compensate for
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these limitations by relying primarily on our GAAP results and using these non-GAAP financial
measures only supplementally. Further, other companies, including companies in our industry,
may calculate adjusted net earnings and adjusted net earnings per diluted common share
differently and as the number of differences in the way two different companies calculate these
measures increases, the degree of their usefulness as comparative measures correspondingly
decreases
Loss (Gain) on Extinguishment of Debt
On May 12, 2010, we commenced a cash tender offer to purchase up to $270.0 million aggregate
principal amount of our 81/4% Senior Notes due 2015 (the "2015 Notes") at a purchase price
equal to 107% of the principal amount of the 2015 Notes purchased, plus accrued and unpaid
interest. On June 11, 2010, we purchased $269.9 million aggregate principal amount of the 2015
Notes validly tendered pursuant to the terms of the tender offer. In addition, during the year
ended December 31, 2010, we purchased in the open market an additional $27.9 million
aggregate principal amount of the 2015 Notes at a weighted-average purchase price of 105.6% of
the principal amount of the 2015 Notes purchased, plus accrued and unpaid interest. We
recognized a pre-tax loss on extinguishment of debt of $23.9 million during the year ended
December 31, 2010, which represents the difference between the aggregate purchase price and
the aggregate principal amount of the 2015 Notes purchased and the proportionate write-off of
related capitalized debt issuance costs.
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Appendix D: Variable Definitions
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme observations.
Variable Definition
Gain Gain/loss from extinguishment of debt (Compustat 'dtep') deflated by total assets
(Compustat 'at')
Meet/Beat -1*(actual pre-extinguishment earnings per share (EPS) minus the latest analysts'
consensus EPS forecast prior to the repurchase. I use the last consensus analysts'
forecast prior to the repurchase and exclude companies that change their fiscal year end
during the year to avoid multiple entries for analysts' forecasts)/ common shares
outstanding (Compustat 'csho').
Pre-extinguishment Earnings before the inclusion of the gain from extinguishment of debt scaled by lagged
earnings total assets.
A Earnings The difference in pre-extinguishment earnings from the current to the previous year,
scaled by lagged total assets. Pre-extinguishment earnings are measured as net income
before extraordinary items (Compustat 'ib').
POST 145 A dummy variable equal to one if the bond repurchase was executed after the passage of
SFAS 145 in 2002 and zero otherwise.
POST 159 A dummy variable equal to one if the bond repurchase was executed after the passage of
SFAS 159 in 2007 and zero otherwise.
Size The natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat 'at').
ROA Issuer's return on assets. Compustat ('oibdp'/('at't + 'at', 1 )/2).
Leverage Leverage measured as total debt to total asset (Compustat ('dle' + 'dltt')/ 'at').
Action size The ratio of the repurchase amount to the firm's total assets.
NOLs Positive indicator variable coded as one if loss carry-forward is positive as of the
beginning of year t.
Spread Credit spread between BBB corporate rated bonds and the risk free rate.
BTM Firm's book-to-market ratio.
Rating Long-term issuer credit ratings compiled by Standard & Poor's and reported on
Compustat (Compustat 'spiticrm'). The ratings range from AAA (highest rating) to D
(lowest rating-debt in payment default). These ratings reflect S&P's assessment of the
creditworthiness of the obligor with respect to its senior debt obligations. In my
analysis, I collapse the multiple ratings into seven categories (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB,
B, and CCC to D), with ratings below BBB being defined as speculative.
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Dummy variable equal to one if the issuer's leverage increased in the year prior to
repurchase and zero otherwise.
Ratio of operating cash flows to total assets (Compustat oancf/at).
Lagged ratio of operating cash flows to total assets (Compustat oancf/ at).
Ratio of cash to total assets (Compustat che/at).
Measure of market expectation of near term volatility conveyed by the S&P 500 stock
index option prices.
Indicator variable that takes on a value of one if firm repurchased debt by tender offer or
open market repurchase and zero otherwise.
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Appendix D: Variable definitions (continued)
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Figure 1: Annual Debt Repurchases
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Figure 2: Comparison of pre- and post-extinguishment earnings
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Fig. 2 shows the distribution of pre-extinguishment earnings (bars) and post-extinguishment earnings (line)
scaled by lagged total assets.
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Figure 3: Distribution of impact of extinguishment gains/losses 
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Table 1: Sample Description (1994-2011)
Panel A: Sample Reconciliation
Total tender and open market repurchases on Mergent FISD (Issue-Firm-Year obs) 3,238
Multiple actions per effective dates (1,264)
Total tender and open market repurchases on Mergent FISD (Issue-Firm-Year obs) 1,974
Total tender and open market repurchases on Mergent FISD (Firm-Year obs) 1,261
Availability of Compustat financial data (593)
Sample with Available Compustat financial data 668
Hand-collected observations from EDGAR 110
Final Sample 778
Panel B: Sample Distribution by 2-digit SIC industry
1-digit SIC industry Number Percent
0 58 7.46%
1 49 6.30%
2 67 8.61%
3 108 13.89%
4 99 12.73%
5 87 11.18%
6 191 24.55%
7 38 4.88%
8 81 10.41%
9 0 0.00%
Total 778 100.00%
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Table 1 (continued): Sample Description (1994-2011)
Panel C: Proportion and Total Value of Debt Retired by Repurchase
Proportion of debt retired Total value in '000s
Year N in each issue
1994 1 1.0000 100,000
1995 5 1.0000 85,344
1996 9 0.9900 115,387
1997 19 1.0000 85,648
1998 76 0.9953 166,371
1999 78 1.0000 152,585
2000 86 0.9923 410,795
2001 76 0.9727 169,200
2002 48 0.9538 205,196
2003 83 0.8514 274,570
2004 98 0.8138 275,056
2005 95 0.9045 282,060
2006 130 0.8270 187,726
2007 196 0.9098 310,191
2008 146 0.7815 226,534
2009 163 0.5709 1,547,217
2010 210 0.5496 223,850
Total 1,519 0.8500 4,817,730
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Sample Descriptive Statistics- Independent and Dependent variables
#Obs Mean Median
Gain 778 0.012 0.001
Meet/Beat 778 -0.003 0.000
A Earnings 778 0.000 -0.001
NOLs (indicator variable) 778 0.364
Action Size 778 0.026 0.013
Spread 778 0.189 0.138
Size 778 5.591 6.681
Leverage 778 0.399 0.378
ROA 778 -0.015 -0.002
BTM 778 0.267 0.306
Panel B: Issue characteristics
#Obs Mean Median
Repurchase amount (thousands) 778 266,921 150,190
Proportion of outstanding amount retired 778 0.69 0.73
Initial maturity (years) 778 14.14 10.57
Remaining maturity (years) 778 8.64 6.65
Yearly repurchase amount (thousands) 778 335,353 167,788
Yearly repurchase amount/ Total assets 778 0.04 0.05
Premium offered over market price 520 0.75% 5.23%
Panel C: Sample Descriptive Statistics by repurchase type
Open market repurchase Tender issue repurchase
#Obs Mean Median #Obs Mean Median
ROA 258 -0.043 0.010 520 -0.006 0.014
Leverage/ Total Assets 258 0.396 0.331 520 0.432 0.380
Log(Total assets) 258 7.386 7.300 520 8.588 8.760
Gain/Loss from extinguishment of 258 0.013 0.002 520 -0.011 -0.002
debt/ Total Assets
Action size (thousands) 258 145,377 49,800 520 327,226 200,000
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Panel D: Distribution of the impact of reported securitization gains on earnings
#Obs Mean Median
Repurchase amount (thousands) 778 266,921 150,190
Proportion of outstanding amount retired 778 0.69 0.73
Initial maturity (years) 778 14.14 10.57
Remaining maturity (years) 778 8.64 6.65
Yearly repurchase amount (thousands) 778 335,353 167,788
Yearly repurchase amount/ Total assets 778 0.04 0.05
Premium offered over market price 520 0.75% 5.23%
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Table 3: Tests of HI: Association between extinguishment gains and the risk of missing
earnings benchmarks
This table reports the estimation of the relation between gains/losses on extinguishment of debt
and the risk of missing earnings benchmarks.
Gaini,t = a + fl1 EM i,t + j 0f; Controls; +Ei,t
Prediction
+
+
EM
Action size
Spread
Firm Size,_
Leverage,-,
ROA,_ 
BTM,-1
Rating,-,
Constant
+-
Meet/Beat
(1)
0.32***
(4.61)
0.07***
(4.73)
0. 12***
(5.86)
0.07
(1.42)
0.38***
(4.75)
-0.30**
(-2.61)
-0.00
(-1.82)
0.16**
(2.04)
1.14***
(4.22)
on pre-repurchase
(1
A Earnings
(2)
0.29***
(4.26)
0.02**
(3.32)
0.04***
(8.32)
0.03
(1.73)
0-33***
(3.59)
-0.12***
(-3.87)
0.01
(0.28)
0.22***
(3.86)
0.34***
(4.60)
Observations 778 778
Adjusted R2  0.19 0.17
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
The regression is run for debt repurchases either in the open market or via a tender offer. Firm and year fixed effects
are included in the regressions. Variables are defined in the appendix. Asymptotic t-statistics reported in parentheses
are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels. * * * indicate significance at 1%, 5%,
or 10% level respectively
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?
Table 4: Tests of H2 & H3: Time-series variation of extinguishment gains
Earnings Management Benchmarks
Meet/Beat A Earnings
Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4)
EM +
Post 145
EM * Post 145 +
0.35**
(2.68)
0.02
(1.24)
0.03***
(4.13)
Post 159
EM * Post 145 * Post 159
Action size
Spread
?2
+
Firm Sizer.1
Leverage,-,
ROA,._
BTM,_ I
Rating,-i
Observations
Adjusted R2
Firm FE
+
0.02***
(5.79)
0.04***
(3.93)
0.11
(0.50)
0.21 ***
(3.63)
-0.01
(-1.35)
-0.01
(-0.04)
0.04***
(3.28)
778
0.20
Yes
0.4 1*
(1.80)
0.01
(0.96)
0.07**
(2.55)
-0.01
(-1.62)
-0.02*
(-1.40)
0.12
(0.35)
0.02***
(3.35)
0.10
(1.68)
0.12**
(3.30)
-0.15
(-1.60)
-0.06
(-0.80)
0.06**
(3.04)
778
0.22
Yes
0.24*
(1.42)
0.02
(-0.21)
0.14***
(3.41)
0.10*
(2.05)
0.14**
(2.32)
0.02
(1.79)
0.09**
(2.91)
-0.30*
(-2.14)
-0.02
(-0.75)
0.02***
(4.47)
778
0.18
Yes
0.32**
(2.08)
0.02
(0.26)
0.15***
(3.65)
-0.04
(-1.20)
-0.11
(-1.20)
0.09*
(1.99)
0.06*
(1.53)
0.03
(0.10)
0.07
(2.66)**
-0.39
(-1.82)
-0.02
(-0.30)
0.01 ***
(5.41)
778
0.19
Yes
This table reports the relationship between gains on debt extinguishment and the risk of missing earnings
benchmarks following regulatory changes that affected the accounting for debt repurchases.
Gaini,t = a + /11EMi,t + #2 Post 145 + #3 EM * Post 145 + Z; f3; Controls; + Ei,t (2)
Gaini,t = a + #11EMi,t + #l2 Post 145 + /13 EM * Post 145 + #4 Post 159 + #15EM * Post 145 * Post 159 +
YL ;1j Controls; + Ei,t (3)
The regression is run for debt repurchases either in the open market or via a tender offer. Firm fixed effects are
included in the regressions. The specification also includes the intercept. Variables are defined in the appendix.
Asymptotic t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year
levels. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively.
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Table 5: Tests of H4: Cross-sectional variation of gains/losses on extinguishment of debt
Meet/Beat A Earnings
Prediction (1) (2)
EM + 0.08* 0.26**
(1.76) (2.68)
NOLs ? -0.02 -0.02
(-0.43) (1.17)
EM * NOLs + 0.02** 0.03***
(2.44) (3.29)
Action size ? 0.02*** 0.04**
(4.44) (2.32)
Spread + 0.18* 0.28**
(1.84) (2.44)
Firm Size,-, ? 0.05** 0.04**
(2.54) (2.70)
Leverage,-i 0.10 0.18
(1.40) (1.54)
ROAI-I ? -0.00 -0.02**
(-0.01) (2.90)
BTMi-i ? 0.05*** 0.05*
(7.46) (1.90)
Rating,-, + 0.02** 0.01***
(2.20) (3.44)
Observations 574 574
Adjusted R2  0.34 0.19
Firm FE Yes Yes
This table reports cross-sectional variation between gains on debt extinguishment and the risk of missing earnings
benchmarks.
Gainit = a + /31EM i,t + /l2 NOLs + /33 EM * NOLs + Yj fl; Controls; + Ei't (4)
This subsample only retains observations for repurchases that occurred after the passage of SFAS 145. The
regressions are run for debt repurchases either in the open market or via a tender offer. Firm and year fixed effects
are included in the regressions. The specification also includes the intercept (untabulated). Variables are defined in
the appendix. Asymptotic t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm
and year levels. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively.
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Table 6: Robustness tests: Association between extinguishment gains and the risk of
missing earnings benchmarks- IncLev subsample
Meet/Beat A Earnings
Prediction (1) (2)
EM
Action size
Spread
Firm Size,-,
Leverage,-,
ROA-i1
BTM,-i
Rating,-,
Constant
+
+
+
0.13**
(2.01)
0.04***
(3.94)
0.05
(1.28)
0.11
(0.87)
0.12*
(1.95)
0.10
(0.95)
0.25
(0.37)
0.10***
(4.71)
1.99
(1.72)
0.14**
(2.11)
0.03
(1.57)
0.03**
(2.13)
0.01
(0.22)
0.03
(0.58)
-0.01
(-1.31)
0.21
(0.01)
0.03***
(4.04)
1.33
(0.61)
Observations 337 337
Adjusted R2  0.24 0.04
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation of the gains/losses on extinguishment of debt on and the risk of missing earnings
benchmarks.
Gain,t = a + f31EM,t + >j f3, Controls; +et (1)
The regression is run for debt repurchases either in the open market or via a tender offer for the IncLev subsample,
which consists of observations where the leverage 1 year after the repurchase either remained constant or increased
relative to the year before repurchase. Firm and year fixed effects are included in the regressions. Variables are
defined in the appendix. Asymptotic t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered
at the firm and year levels. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively
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Table 7: Robustness tests: Association between repurchase decision and risk of missing
earnings benchmarks
Panel A: Meet/Beat
Meet/Beat
Prediction (1) (2) (3)
Meet/Beat + 0.09 0.12 0.13
(0.65)
Post 145
Meet/Beat* Post 145
Post 159
Meet/Beat* Post 145 * Post 159
Inc Lev
Cash
OCF
LagOCF
Action size
Spread
Firm Size, 1
Leverage,-1
ROA,1
BTM,-
Rating,1
Observations
Adjusted R 2
Firm FE
Year FE
?
(0.81)
-0.03
(-0.33)
0.05
(0.29)
+
+
(0.87)
0.02
(-0.52)
0.03
(0.27)
-0.03
(-0.66)
-0.01
(-0.54)
-0.40**
(-3.27)
1.19***
(3.59)
0.28
(1.23)
-0.35
(-0.59)
0.04**
(2.76)
0.02**
(2.79)
0.00
(0.63)
0.06
(1.17)
-0.52
(-0.72)
0.03
(1.12)
0.02*
(2.25)
1524
0.01
Yes
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-0.40*
(-2.23)
1.19**
(2.53)
0.32
(0.60)
-0.38
(-0.24)
0.06
(1.61)
0.02**
(6.01)
0.02*
(1.96)
0.09
(0.62)
-0.43
(-0.98)
0.01
(0.54)
0.04**
(2.97)
1524
0.00
Yes
Yes
-0.35***
(-4.21)
1.10***
(3.32)
0.25
(0.05)
-0.39
(-0.84)
0.05**
(2.80)
0.04**
(3.20)
0.01
(0.57)
0.11
(0.65)
-0.49
(-1.43)
-0.03
(-0.70)
0.0 1*
(2.11)
1524
0.01
Yes
+
Table 7: Robustness tests: Association between repurchase decision and risk of missing
earnings benchmarks
Panel B: A Earnings
A Earnings
Prediction (1) (2) (3)
A Earnings + 0.02
(1.36)
Post 145
A Earnings * Post 145 +
0.05*
(1.42)
0.01
(0.03)
0.04
(0.58)
Post 159
A Earnings * Post 145 * Post 159
Inc Lev
Cash
?9
+
OCF
LagOCF
Action size
Spread +
Firm Size, 1
Leverage,_1
ROAr1
BTMI-i
Rating,-1
Observations
Adjusted R2
Firm FE
Year FE
+
-0.33*
(-2.00)
0.68***
(3.72)
0.60
(1.48)
-0.31
(-0.28)
0.02*
(1.87)
0.02**
(2.50)
0.03
(1.48)
0.09
(1.29)
-0.42
(-0.12)
0.03
(0.98)
0.05**
(2.71)
1524
0.02
Yes
Yes
-0.35***
(-4.22)
1.13**
(1.96)
0.25
(1.29)
-0.41
(-0.05)
0.06
(1.11)
0.03**
(2.51)
0.01
(0.79)
0.11
(0.66)
-0.45
(-1.23)
-0.02
(-0.91)
0.02***
(3.57)
1524
0.02
Yes
0.05
(0.72)
(0.02
(0.25)
0.06
(0.43)
-0.03
(-1.17)
-0.05
(-0.76)
-0.39**
(-2.89)
1.21***
(3.17)
0.22
(1.02)
-0.42
(-0.64)
0.05*
(1.74)
0.02*
(1.83)
0.05
(1.95)
0.07
(1.34)
-0.46
(-1.47)
-0.01
(-1.15)
0.02***
(2.90)
1524
0.03
Yes
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This table reports the estimation of the gains/losses on extinguishment of debt on pre-repurchase earnings shortfall
relative to earnings benchmarks. P(Repurchase)i,t = a + f#1EMi,t + >jf # Controls +Ei,t (6)
The regression is run for debt repurchases either in the open market or via a tender offer. Firm and year fixed effects
are included in the regressions. Variables are defined in the appendix. Asymptotic t-statistics reported in parentheses
are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels. * **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%,
or 10% level respectively.
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Table 8: Supplemental Tests: Association between extinguishment gains and the risk of
missing an earnings target partitioned by method of repurchase
Open Market Repurchases Tender Offers
Meet/Beat A Earnings Meet/Beat A Earnings
Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4)
EM
Action size
Spread
Firm Size,-,
Leverage,-,
ROAI1
B TMt-i
Rating,-,
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2
Firm FE
Year FE
+
+
+
0.25***
(4.44)
0.12***
(4.99)
0.13***
(8.95)
0.13**
(2.39)
0.38***
(4.51)
-0.04**
(-2.46)
0.08
(0.44)
0.19**
(2.63)
5.02***
(4.61)
232
0.39
Yes
Yes
0.31***
(3.21)
0.08***
(3.97)
0.16***
(8.42)
0.07
(1.15)
0.39***
(3.52)
-0.04**
(-2.86)
0.06
(0.62)
0.22***
(3.30)
4.88***
(14.64)
232
0.25
Yes
Yes
0.25*
(1.42)
0.06***
(4.89)
0.07***
(4.60)
0.01
(1.14)
0.30***
(3.80)
-0.34**
(-2.54)
-0.06
(-1.43)
0.14***
(3.99)
4.32***
(7.04)
439
0.24
Yes
Yes
0.28**
(2.90)
0.04**
(3.33)
0.01***
(8.91)
0.04
(0.35)
0.30***
(3.44)
-0.22***
(-4.51)
-0.05
(-0.10)
0. 12***
(3.53)
4.56***
(13.56)
439
0.09
Yes
Yes
This table reports the estimation of the gains/losses on extinguishment of debt on earnings management incentives.
Gaini,t = a + f 1 EM1 ,t + ; f3; Controls; +Ei,t (1)
The regression is run for a subsample of debt repurchases partitioned by the method of repurchase. Firm and year
fixed effects are included in the regressions. Variables are defined in the appendix. Asymptotic t-statistics reported
in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels. * **, * indicate
significance at 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively.
64
?
